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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 















LARRY D. JEFFRIES, d/b/a L&D CONTRACTING;  
GENE NEWHAMS, d/b/a GN ELECTRICAL; 




Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01737)  
District Judge: Honorable Robert C. Mitchell  
______________   
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2019 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, ROTH, FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 






This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Seneca Insurance Co. (“Seneca”), as Subrogee of Wild Blue 
Management LLP, challenges the District Court’s denial of Seneca’s motion in limine, 
which requested the disqualification of defendant’s expert Ralph Dolence and the denial 
of its post-trial motion for a new trial.   For the reasons that follow we affirm.  
I. 
This appeal arises out of a claim of negligence against Mark Beal and Mark’s 
Maintenance and Repair (collectively, “Beal”) after a fire on December 17, 2012 that 
caused substantial and costly damage to the Natrona Heights Shopping Plaza owned by 
Wild Blue Management, Inc. in Natrona Heights, Pennsylvania.  As its insurer, Seneca 
paid Wild Blue Management’s losses resulting from the fire.  The dispute at trial was 
over the origin and cause of the fire, whether Beal acted negligently while removing a 
neon sign, and whether those actions or omissions were a factual cause of the fire.  At 
trial, plaintiff employed three experts: Dennis Brew, who specialized in installing and 
removing neon signs; Gerald Kufta, a private investigator specializing in fires; and 
Samuel Sero, a forensic engineer.  At issue in this appeal is the testimony of defendant's 
only expert witness, Ralph Dolence (“Dolence”), a career fire fighter, fire officer, 
licensed master electrician, and forensic expert.  
On March 28, 2018, the jury reached a verdict that Beal was negligent when he 
removed a neon sign from the façade of a vacant storefront in the plaza, but that Beal's 




Beal’s actions or omissions were not the factual cause of the fire, it did not determine 
what percentage of negligence should be attributed to Beal.  On April 25, 2018, Seneca 
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new 
trial.  The District Court denied Seneca’s motion on June 14, 2018.  Seneca timely 
appealed. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
II.  
A.    Motion in Limine 
 Appellant claims the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Seneca's 
motion in limine, asserting that Dolence’s expert witness testimony was speculative and 
lacked foundation.  We review the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion, and 
will not disturb its decision unless “no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s 
view.”  Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002).  To 
constitute an abuse of discretion, the District Court’s decision must have been “arbitrary, 
fanciful, or clearly unreasonable.”  Id.  
Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, the trial judge serves as a gatekeeper to determine 
whether the witness’ methodology is relevant and reliable.  Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, 
Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997).  “[I]f the methodology and reasoning are 




of fact that must assess the expert's conclusions.”  In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  
Whether or not expert testimony is admissible “focuses on principles and 
methodology and not the conclusions they generate.”  Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 807. 
Dolence was qualified as an expert witness under Rule 702 because of his knowledge 
from years of professional experience, which included over 30 years as a fire investigator 
and 40 years as a licensed electrician.  At the time of his testimony, Dolence, a qualified 
forensic expert in 30 states, had served on arson task forces, investigated over 12,000 
fires, and taught hundreds of classes on fire causes and origin investigations.    
Dolence’s testimony was based on, among other things, his personal observations 
and review of materials from the fire investigation.  The foundation of his opinion was an 
examination of several hundred photographs, videos, and other documentation provided 
by the township, fire marshal, and individuals who were at the scene of the fire.  He also 
analyzed depositions, documents, and reports provided by appellant’s experts and 
attended a joint evidence examination with Gerald Kufta and several other experts.  
Dolence based his opinion on standards and guidelines of the National Fire Protection 
Association (“NFPA”).  Using his expert knowledge, Dolence examined the evidence and 
facts provided to him and compared it to the industry standard, and ultimately testified 
that the cause of the fire was “undetermined” because the fire investigation was improper 




Upon review of Dolence’s report and testimony, there is no “definite and firm 
conviction that the [District Court] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion 
it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 
136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).  For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Seneca’s motion in limine. 
B.    Motion for a new trial 
Seneca also appeals the District Court’s denial of its post-trial motion for a new 
trial.  Seneca asserts that it is entitled to a new trial because Dolence's testimony was 
improper, as it caused jury confusion regarding the legal standard for proving factual 
causation of the fire.  We review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  
Leonard v. Stemtech Int'l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 386 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Seneca argues that Dolence’s testimony implied that the standard of proof was to 
rule out every other cause of the fire and that he testified to hypothetical causes of the 
fire.  As the District Court properly noted in its Memorandum and Order, Dolence’s 
testimony about the flaws in the fire investigation was permissible.  Dolence specifically 
testified about the flaws in the methodology and parts of the investigation that were, in 
his opinion, improper based upon NFPA 1033, which outlines the proper ways 
investigators must collect and preserve evidence.    
The record reflects that Dolence did not impose a burden of proof or outline a 
legal standard as Seneca alleges.  Rather, he described the methods of fire investigation 




examining over 12,000 fires over the course of his 30-year career as a fire investigator.   
Although Dolence’s testimony may have contradicted the opinions of Seneca’s experts, 
as the District Court properly noted, Seneca had the opportunity to attack the credibility 
of Dolence’s testimony through cross examination and did so at trial.    
As part of its argument, Seneca points to an “inconsistent” verdict, because the 
jury found Beal to be negligent but that his negligence was not a factual cause of the fire.1  
The two questions answered by the jury were: (1) “Was the defendant, Mark Beal doing 
business as Mark’s Maintenance and Repair, negligent?”; and (2) “If you answered 
Question No. 1 ‘Yes,’ was the negligence of Mark Beal doing business as Mark’s 
Maintenance and Repair a factual cause of any harm to the plaintiff?”  App. at 0002 – 
0003.   
These are two separate questions, designed to determine whether or not Beal was 
liable.  For Beal to be found liable for the damage of the fire, the jury needed to answer 
“Yes” to Question 2.   Two distinct answers to these separate questions does not 
demonstrate that Dolence mislead the jury through his testimony.  Rather, this simply 
indicates that the jury, weighing the evidence presented by both parties, deliberated and 
concluded that Beal’s actions or omissions were not the factual cause of the fire.   
 
1 Seneca does not dispute that it waived any challenge to the verdict on appeal, but rather 
argues that what it claims to be an “inconsistent” verdict is evidence that Seneca was 






For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District Court’s decision to deny 
Seneca’s motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a 
New Trial. 
